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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Workers' fears—of job loss, of strikes, of management retaliation—are well-documented 
obstacles to successful union organizing. Exploiting these fears is at the heart of employers' union-
avoidance strategies. Unorganized workers are well aware that management opposition creates real and 
potential risks in organizing. Not so well documented is the effect of conflict generated during the 
organizing process. Conflict is distinct from fear because the adversarial relationship itself has an impact 
on undecided workers. Management and their consultants can take actions that polarize the workplace 
and then transfer blame to "outside" union organizers and inside "troublemakers." 
We believe that conflict is at least as important as fear in arousing anti-union sentiments, especially in 
organizing campaigns among professional, technical, and office workers. Our research indicates that 
understanding and addressing the issue of conflict is essential for success among these workers. 
Without more attention to its influence, by default, private-sector organizing may well appeal to only those 
workers with little to lose. 
The role of fear and conflict in employers' union-avoidance campaigns will first be explored with the aid of 
several cases;' we will distinguish between fear and conflict while demonstrating their entanglement. 
Next, we will explore in detail the campaign by the Communications Workers of America to organize 
computer technicians employed by AT&T's NCR subsidiary. We will present survey data based on 
interviews with 320 of these technicians, which enable us to evaluate their attitudes toward unionization. 
The data along with field experience indicate that aversion to conflict provides a significant explanation 
for hesitancy to organize among workers who are otherwise favorably disposed toward unions. Finally, we 
will discuss strategies to overcome fear and conflict and argue that the extent to which workers build 
their own organizations is directly related to the workers' likely success. 
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Chapter 11 
Fear, Conflict, and Union Organizing 
Larry Cohen and Richard W. Hurd 
Workers' fears—of job loss, of strikes, of management retaliation—are 
well-documented obstacles to successful union organizing. Exploiting these 
fears is at the heart of employers' union-avoidance strategies (Bronfenbren-
ner 1994; Freeman 1985; Hurd 1994, Weiler 1983). Unorganized workers 
are well aware that management opposition creates real and potential risks 
in organizing. Not so well documented is the effect of conflict generated 
during the organizing process. Conflict is distinct from fear because the 
adversarial relationship itself has an impact on undecided workers. Man-
agement and their consultants can take actions that polarize the workplace 
and then transfer blame to "outside" union organizers and inside "trouble-
makers." 
We believe that conflict is at least as important as fear in arousing anti-
union sentiments, especially in organizing campaigns among professional, 
technical, and office workers. Our research indicates that understanding 
and addressing the issue of conflict is essential for success' among these 
workers. Without more attention to its influence, by default, private-sector 
organizing may well appeal to only those workers with little to lose. 
The role of fear and conflict in employers' union-avoidance campaigns 
will first be explored with the aid of several cases;' we will distinguish 
between fear and conflict while demonstrating their entanglement. Next, 
we will explore in detail the campaign by the Communications Workers 
of America to organize computer technicians employed by AT&T's NCR 
subsidiary. We will present survey data based on interviews with 320 of 
these technicians, which enable us to evaluate their attitudes toward union-
ization. The data along with field experience indicate that aversion to con-
flict provides a significant explanation for hesitancy to organize among 
workers who are otherwise favorably disposed toward unions. Finally, we 
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will discuss strategies to overcome fear and conflict and argue that the 
extent to which workers build their own organizations is directly related to 
the workers' likely success. 
The Specter of Conflict 
Employers use a variety of tactics to wage their campaigns of fear and 
intimidation. Firing union activists, harassing and discriminating against 
union supporters, threatening plant closings or layoffs, and suggesting the 
inevitability of strikes are all tactics designed to exploit workers' fears. The 
intent is to increase dramatically the expected cost of unionization and to 
convince undecided voters and reserved union supporters that organizing is 
not worth the^risks. 
Intertwined 'with these appeals to fear are efforts to create anxiety about 
workplace life in a unionized future. In particular, employers attempt to 
portray union adherents as malcontents committed to a confrontational 
approach that will translate into a state of perpetual conflict if the organiz-
ing campaign succeeds. Typically, this unsavory picture is counterposed 
with a peaceful and cooperative nonunion future based on promises of 
improved communication and an increased voice for workers. 
For example, when workers at Teksid Aluminum's Dickson, Tennessee, 
plant attempted to organize with the assistance of the Aluminum, Brick and 
Glass Workers (ABGW), Teksid's director of human resources referred to 
ABGW adherents as "union slime." One worker who refused to wear an 
antiunion button being distributed by the company was ordered to sweep 
the basement. Another was cursed by his supervisor for wearing a pro-union 
button at work. A third was fired for theft when he placed an inexpensive 
file in his back pocket while cleaning his work area. These and a series 
of similar incidents created an intimidating atmosphere that scared away 
potential union supporters. After setting this negative tone with its anti-
union campaign, Teksid's management complained to its employees that 
production was suffering because of the "high tension" caused by the or-
ganizing campaign. On the eve of the NLRB election, the company's presi-
dent asked employees to choose cooperation over adversarialism: "You can 
vote for this union and make me negotiate against you, or you can vote 
against this union and help me shape Teksid into a team" (Hurd 1994:15-
16). 
When ACTWU attempted to assist a group of workers interested in form-
ing a union at BMP America in Medina, New York, the company con-
demned the "name callers" and suggested in a memo that "employees [who] 
are sick and tired of being hounded and harassed to sign cards . . . [should] 
tell the union organizer to get lost." Meanwhile, an informal work environ-
i'^jr 
ment gave way to a crackdown on co 
union supporters. An "Employee-Mc 
as a peaceful alternative to the uni< 
ganizer, "The critical group needed 
Employee-Management Committee i 
the boss" (Hurd and Uehlein 1994:1; 
Lundy Packing in Clinton, North 
reaction to an organizing campaign ir 
United Food and Commercial Work 
meetings were supplemented by a se 
were warned of strikes and the likeb 
union supporters were fired, one f 
(against a seldom enforced policy), ( 
from the company for thirty years of 
er's message was job loss, as summ; 
captive-audience meeting: "The bes 
check, is to vote 'no' in this election 
campaign, a final speech by Lundy's 
defeat this union, then we can get o 
as far as I'm concerned, the battle 
Uehlein 1994:96-98). 
Some employers lay the foundatioi 
on the conflict hyperbole. After facii 
of the country, K-Mart hired a w< 
reorganize its human resource mam 
ferred to as "associates") and otherw 
bution center to retain its union-fr& 
organizing campaign, and on cue tl 
the Associate Relations Committee a 
tee. While these committees went tc 
(union activists were barred from 
broad-ranging campaign complete ' 
of plant closing, harassment of uni 
talking home visitors." One flyer d 
conflict: "The union has already c 
friendships between our associates s 
lose because of the union? AS A T 
RALLY TOGETHER TO PROTE 
OUR FUTURE" (Hurd 1994:50-51 
Our point in reviewing these ca 
specter of conflict to magnify othe 
think like this: "Even if the union w 
FEAR, CONFLICT, AND UNION ORGANIZING 
ment gave way to a crackdown on conversations, especially those involving 
union supporters. An "Employee-Management Committee" was presented 
as a peaceful alternative to the union. As described by the ACTWU or-
ganizer, "The critical group needed for a majority . . . latched on to the 
Employee-Management Committee as a way to avoid the need to confront 
the boss" (Hurd and Uehlein 1994:134-38). 
Lundy Packing in Clinton, North Carolina, was more aggressive in its 
reaction to an organizing campaign initiated by workers with the help of the 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). Several captive-audience 
meetings were supplemented by a series of small-group meetings. Workers 
were warned of strikes and the likely futility of collective bargaining. Four 
union supporters were fired, one for wearing a wristwatch on the job 
(against a seldom enforced policy), even though the watch had been a gift 
from the company for thirty years of service. The centerpiece of the employ-
er's message was job loss, as summarized by the operations manager in a 
captive-audience meeting: "The best way to protect your job, your pay-
check, is to vote 'no' in this election." Against the backdrop of this intense 
campaign, a final speech by Lundy's owner undoubtedly rang true: "If we 
defeat this union, then we can get on with it. If the union wins, well, then 
as far as I'm concerned, the battle has probably just begun" (Hurd and 
Uehlein 1994:96-98). 
Some employers lay the foundation for union resistance in advance, based 
on the conflict hyperbole. After facing organizing campaigns in other parts 
of the country, K-Mart hired a well-known antiunion law firm to help 
reorganize its human resource management system (e.g., workers were re-
ferred to as "associates") and otherwise prepare its Newnan, Georgia, distri-
bution center to retain its union-free status. A year later, the IBT began an 
organizing campaign, and on cue the company created two committees— 
the Associate Relations Committee and the Employee Involvement Commit-
tee. While these committees went to work addressing employees' concerns 
(union activists were barred from the meetings), K-Mart implemented a 
broad-ranging campaign complete with antiunion videos, T-shirts, threats 
of plant closing, harassment of union supporters, and an attack on "fast-
talking home visitors." One flyer directly addressed the issue of perpetual 
conflict: "The union has already caused a lot of dissension and loss of 
friendships between our associates so far, how much more are we willing to 
lose because of the union? AS A TEAM NOT A TEAMSTER, WE CAN 
RALLY TOGETHER TO PROTECT OUR JOBS, OUR RIGHTS AND 
OUR FUTURE" (Hurd 1994:50-51). 
Our point in reviewing these cases is to show how employers use the 
specter of conflict to magnify other concerns. Workers are encouraged to 
think like this: "Even if the union wins the organizing campaign, even if the 
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company stays open and I keep my job, even if the union lets us vote 
whether or not to strike, the future will be filled with conflict which could 
flare into war at any time. Who wants to work in an environment like that? 
Why take the risk?" 
HarperCollins and the CWA 
Fear and conflict were major components of the management campaign at 
HarperCollins Publishing in San Francisco.1 In late 1992, eighty office, 
marketing, and professional employees attempted to organize a union with 
help from CWA Local 9410. An experienced organizer met with leaders of 
the group and conducted inoculation training, portraying a typical em-
ployer campaign to fight unionization. Gina Hyams, a rank-and-file leader, 
described the group's reaction to the training: "Naively we thought, almost 
all our bosses are liberal Democrats. The company's profits come from 
publishing tons of progressive self-help books. If we decide to form a union, 
our management will just recognize that we're trying to help ourselves and 
they'll be civil and sit down and fairly negotiate a reasonable contract. We 
were wrong" (Herrera and Marklin 1993:4). 
Of the eighty-three mostly college-educated women in the unit, sixty-two 
signed a CWA election petition. The company responded with a standard 
antiunion campaign. Top HarperCollins management personnel were in-
volved, in addition to corporate counsel. Four of the most active union 
leaders were "laid off." Two others were "promoted" out of the unit. CEO 
George Craig flew in from New York to tell the staff in a captive-audience 
meeting that he considered organizing "war" and all employees involved in 
the campaign "disloyal." 
Local managers were enlisted to sign a joint letter to employees arguing 
that unionization "would not serve to promote cooperation and solidarity." 
These same managers had encouraged the formation of a "nonmanagement 
group" two years earlier to discuss problems in a coUegial manner. In fact, it 
was the failure to accomplish substantive change after two years of working 
through informal task forces that had created sufficient frustration to spawn 
the CWA organizing drive. Although management continued to proclaim 
its willingness to confer an occasional consulting role on its employees 
through the nonmanagement group, it would not tolerate an independent 
organization that could bargain and receive its own support from the CWA. 
As summarized in a letter sent to every worker at home from Senior Vice 
President Clayton Carlson: "The current feisty, free and open involvement 
of the entire staff as part of our working life is ironically what would be 
1. For a more detailed account of this case, see Herrera and Marklin 1993:3-8. 
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a& 
most endangered by the success of the CWA petition. . . . To unsettle that 
dynamic mixture by drawing an artificial line down the middle of our 
organization is a step backward . . . and endangers most directly those val-
ues which we all hold dear (Herrera and Marklin 1993:4). 
The CWA lost the election thirty-one to thirty-six, of which four ballots 
were challenged. Subsequently, the National Labor Relations Board over-
turned the results, certified the union based on unfair labor practices com-
mitted by HarperCollins, and ordered the parties to bargain. Three years 
later, in March 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the NLRB's judg-
ment but reversed the remedy, vacating the certification and bargaining 
order. 
While the use of fear in this campaign was quite obvious, management's 
use of conflict was more subtle. Its argument was simply that harmony 
could never be restored, with the proper focus on the editorial function of 
the office, as long as union activity continued. In other words, management 
contended that the presence of a union created tension that would only 
increase with certification. Several swing voters who originally favored the 
CWA switched to "no" votes when they were convinced that the price for 
supporting a union would be continuing disruption. 
NCR Customer Engineers and the CWA 
NCR customer engineers install and repair computer equipment, mostly 
manufactured by the company. Their average service is twenty years. They 
are highly educated and receive several months of continuing education 
each year. Average annual income for the group exceeds $40,000. 
Before AT&T's 1991 purchase of the company, NCR had pursued an 
aggressive union-elimination strategy. As of the mid-1960s, about 60 per-
cent of NCR employees (most in manufacturing) had been represented by 
unions. According to NCR company documents, management then imple-
mented a containment program to resist further organization, followed by 
a "Union Free Organization" (UFO) campaign to eliminate collective bar-
gaining in previously organized locations. A management training program 
conducted in 1987 specified four "losses" from unionization that supervi-
sors were expected to convey to workers: plant closings, strikes, the end of 
open relationships with supervisors, and discord. The first two appealed 
directly to fear; the latter two conveyed the specter of conflict. The UFO 
campaign was successful, and by 1996 less than 2 percent of NCR employ-
ees were unionized. 
The CWA's support for organizing among NCR's customer engineers 
began soon after the purchase announcement by AT&T. More than eighty 
thousand AT&T employees were represented by the CWA, including about 
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twenty-five thousand technicians. Many CWA locals with AT&T techni-
cians as members were willing to "adopt" the NCR technicians in their 
areas. The unionized workers at AT&T had much better health-care benefits 
and substantially higher pensions, providing additional encouragement to 
the customer engineers that union representation could provide material 
gain as well as a real voice in decision making. 
Consistent with its "union-free" strategy, NCR ran an aggressive cam-
paign against the CWA with the assistance of the well-known antiunion law 
firm of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler and Krupman. Shortly after the CWA 
lost two close elections among NCR's customer engineers in Dayton and 
Indianapolis in 1992, NCR implemented a union-replacement strategy 
through company-sponsored organizations known as "Satisfaction Coun-
cils." The councils included management personnel, discussed "terms and 
conditions of employment," and were dominated by the employer, including 
control of the agenda for the meetings. In several separate decisions, these 
employee-management committees were ruled violations of section 8(a)2 of 
the National Labor Relations Act and were ordered "disestablished" by the 
NLRB. 
After the two narrow NLRB election losses in Dayton and Indianapolis, 
the CWA organizing strategy focused on building a national organization 
of customer engineers while pressuring for organizing rights through na-
tional AT&T bargaining. Of four thousand customer engineers in the 
United States, about four hundred joined the National Association of NCR 
Employees (NANE) in twenty different NCR districts. In 1995, the cus-
tomer engineers renamed their organization the Voice of Informed Cus-
tomer Engineers (VOICE). 
VOICE had been designed by customer engineers, with support from the 
CWA, to promote their own self-organization. The engineers emphasized 
that this was their organization; they were not simply joining a union, they 
were building one of their own with CWA support. Unlike the Satisfaction 
Councils, they could set their own agendas and launch campaigns on key 
issues. If majority support was achieved, they could seek recognition 
through the NLRB and bargain collectively. 
During the 1995 round of bargaining at AT&T, organizing rights at 
NCR were a significant union issue. Union goals included workplace access, 
neutrality, and card-check recognition. Although agreement was not 
reached in these areas, the company did agree to a payroll deduction for 
VOICE membership dues. Payroll deduction without recognition has long 
been used to sustain employee organizations in the public sector. At least 
for the CWA, this had never before been attempted in the private sector. 
Could such an organization be built after thirty years of management anti-
union campaigning? Was fear an issue among customer engineers faced 
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with continuing restructuring and cutbacks as well as constantly changing 
technologies? 
Given these concerns, a research project was designed to survey the atti-
tudes of NCR's customer engineers about workplace issues and organizing. 
Particular attention was paid to barriers to organizing and to what kind of 
organization the customer engineers would join. The following section re-
views the results of the research project, with an emphasis on the effect of 
fear and conflict on the workers' attitudes. 
The NCR Customer Engineer Survey 
To evaluate the NANE experience, gather information to help direct the 
activities of the newly renamed VOICE, and investigate the issues of fear 
and conflict, a telephone survey was conducted during October 1995. Inter-
views were limited to nine regions of NCR with active NANE chapters. Of 
the approximately 1,500 customer engineers in those regions, a representa-
tive sample of 500 was contacted and 320 were interviewed. All interview-
ees were asked twelve questions, which covered job satisfaction, attitudes 
toward management, the type of workers' organization they preferred (if 
any), and why customer engineers had not joined NANE. 
Answers to the question on the type of organization they preferred are 
summarized in table 11.1. When those who indicated a preference for a 
union are combined with those who voiced support for NANE (which was 
explicitly linked to the CWA in the interview questions), just under 30 
percent of the respondents could be considered pro-union. Only a slightly 
higher share were opposed to any organization, leaving a large group of 
engineers who were neither enthusiastically pro-union nor decidedly against 
organization. A large portion of these "organizable" workers would have 
TABLE 11.1. Type of Organization Preferred by NCR Computer Technicians 
Type of Organization 
1. Union that negotiates contracts 
a. willing to campaign 
b. not willing to support publicly 
2. Voluntary association like NANE 
3. Professional association for entire industry 
4. Employee-management committee like Satisfaction 
Councils 
5. Unsure 
6. Not interested in any organization 
7. Refused to answer 
Total 
Number 
^ 1 
(24) 
(27) 
40 
40 
48 
25 
111 
5 
320 
Percentage 
15.9 
(7.5) 
(8.4) 
12.5 
12.5 
15.0 
7.8 
34.7 
1.6 
100.0 
188 COHEN and HURD 
to be attracted, however, to attain majority status. In the two formal or-
ganizing campaigns conducted in 1992 in Dayton and Indianapolis, the 
CWA received a combined 45 percent of the vote—close enough to a major-
ity to demonstrate that unionization was a viable possibility for these pro-
fessional/technical workers if there was an appropriate organizing strategy 
and the right type of independent organization. 
To explore more carefully the concerns of the marginal voters, a second 
set of twelve questions was posed to workers who showed some interest in 
an organization but,were hesitant to support a union. We defined this 
"uncommitted middle" broadly to include the 180 workers (about 55 per-
cent of the entire sample) who would have liked a union but would not 
support it publicly, or who chose some type of association short of a union, 
or who were unsure what type of organization they wanted (categories 1 b, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 on table 11.1). The additional questions posed to them probed 
in more detail their attitudes toward unions, their reasons for joining or not 
joining an employee association, and the types of services that would be of 
interest. 
To put this into the context of a union organizing campaign in which 
CWA rates workers on a 1 to 3 scale, where 1 represents strong union 
supporters and 3 represents confirmed opponents, this uncommitted middle 
represented the 2s.2 Of course, they were being surveyed after four years of 
CWA/NANE presence, an antiunion campaign by management, the imposi-
tion of Satisfaction Councils, and a successful legal challenge to the Satisfac-
tion Councils. In short, these 2s had been influenced by both labor and 
management during the organizing campaign.3 
The most interesting data gleaned from the survey responses relate to the 
issues of fear and conflict. We asked two questions that were designed to 
address these issues. By comparing answers to these questions with re-
sponses to the rest of the survey, we have been able to develop profiles that 
help to unravel the influences of fear and conflict. One question specifically 
asked all of those interviewed, "What do you feel is the main reason that 
some Customer Engineers have not yet chosen to join NANE/CWA?" We 
offered ten options, including five directly related to fear, three concerned 
with the activities of NANE/CWA, one on unfamiliarity with the organiza-
tion, and one concerning antiunion attitudes. 
2. Some unions use a five-point scale in which 1 is assigned to organizing committee mem-
bers, 2 to other union supporters, 3 to fence sitters, 4 to those leaning against, and 5 to 
opponents. Using this rating system, the uncommitted middle would include all 3s plus some 
2s and 4s. 
3. The workers in Dayton and Indianapolis experienced the influences of the organizing 
campaign more directly. Workers from these regions accounted for just under 20 percent of 
the sample. Their responses were not substantially different from those of other respondents. 
• & 
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TABLE 11.2. Reasons Coworkers Do Not Join NANE, by Type of Organization Preferred 
(in percent) 
Reasons 
Unfamiliar with 
NANE 
Antiunion 
NANE mistakes 
Fear 
Unsure 
Total 
Union 
21.6 
13.7 
15.7 
41.1 
2.0 
100.0 
Voluntary 
Association 
(NANE) 
15.0 
20.0 
20.0 
42.5 
2.5 
100.0 
Professional 
Association 
20.0 
20.0 
25.0 
30.0 
5.0 
100.0 
Employee-
Management 
(Satisfaction 
Council) 
16.7 
41.7 
16.7 
18.8 
6.3 
100.0 
No 
Organization 
6.0 
45.7 
22.4 
12.1 
13.8 
100.0 
Total 
14.4 
30.6 
20.4 
25.3 
9.3 
100.0 
Note: To simplify the table, the answers of those who are unsure what type of organization they would 
prefer are omitted; however, they are included in the totals. 
The responses are summarized in the right-hand column of table 11.2. 
The relatively even distribution of answers among the four options is less 
interesting than the breakdown by "type of organization preferred" in-
cluded in the other columns. The four highlighted cells represent the highest 
response levels. Those who prefer no organization or those who prefer joint 
employee-management committees (the two most antiunion categories) dis-
proportionately believe that their coworkers have not joined NANE/CWA 
because they too are antiunion. Similarly, those in the most pro-union cate-
gories (those who prefer a union or a voluntary association) offer assess-
ments that fit their biases: they disproportionately believe that fear has kept 
their coworkers from joining. Looking specifically at the responses of the 
most pro-union workers, those willing to work on an organizing campaign, 
58.3 percent blame fear,4 three times the share among other workers. In 
other words, the perceptions of the most activist union supporters about 
why their coworkers do not join unions are not representative and may be 
misleading. In the CWA campaign at NCR, the union relied on the organiz-
ing committee's strong perception that fear was the key explanation for the 
reluctance of coworkers to openly support collective action by joining 
NANE. The survey results indicate that this conclusion needs to be reevalu-
ated and the organizing approach adjusted accordingly. 
The second question related to fear and conflict was posed only to those 
in the uncommitted middle; it asked for "the best reasons not to join any 
employee organization." Responses are summarized in table 11.3. Given 
4. This percentage is not reported in the table, which combines the responses of all those 
who supported a union whether or not they were willing to work on a campaign. 
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TABLE 11.3. Best Reason Not to Join Any Employee Organization 
Response Number Percentage 
Dues too high 
Make conditions worse 
Decrease job security 
Decrease possibility of raise 
Hurt NCR 
Create conflict at work 
Loss of individual freedom 
Total responding 
16 
22 
20 
36 
71 
50 
180* 
5.0 
8.9 
12.2 
11.1 
20.0 
39.4 
27.8 
* Only those in the "uncommitted middle" as defined in the text of the chapter were asked this question; 
thus, the total responding was 180. More than one answer was accepted, however, so the number of 
responses totals more, than 180. Percentages are based on 180. 
the centrality of the threat of job loss in the employer's antiunion communi-
cations with workers, we expected "decrease job security" to capture fear 
most directly. The fact that of those interviewed only 12.2 percent selected 
this option reinforces our conclusion that we overestimated the role of fear. 
The related option, "hurt NCR," was included to separate out those feeling 
strong identification with the company; in other words, we used it as an 
ideological screen. The 20.0 percent of the uncommitted middle who se-
lected this option are also concerned about job loss but are likely to be 
ideological opponents of unions at any rate. 
The most frequently cited "best reason not to join" any employee organi-
zation was that such organizations "create conflict at work." Although we 
understood the role of conflict in employers' antiunion campaigns, we had 
not anticipated that it would be of such great concern to those in the 
uncommitted middle. The second most frequent response was "loss of indi-
vidual freedom," another option we introduced as an ideological screen 
since those who are concerned about this issue are less likely than others to 
be attracted to collective action. 
Most important for our purposes, 39.4 percent of those in the uncommit-
ted middle selected "create conflict at work"—more than any other option. 
We will refer to those who selected this option as "conflict avoiders." In 
terms of the type of organization they prefer, these workers are similar to 
others in the middle. They are a little less likely to be unsure about the 
type of organization they prefer, a little more likely to support a voluntary 
association like NANE, and a little less likely to prefer a union. None of 
these differences is statistically significant, however, so it is safe to say 
that the conflict avoiders are a reasonably representative group within the 
uncommitted middle. 
Turning to table 11.4, comparisons of the responses of conflict avoiders 
**' 
& 
TABLE 11.4. Attitudes Associated with Best R 
Organizations (in percent) 
Attitudes 
Create Conflici 
at Work 
46.5 
26.8 
22.5 
16.9 
25.4 
42.3**1 
15.5**1 
*(-
:+ 
Likely to join NANE 52.1 
Better off with union 50.7 
Work-related activities you would support: 
Petitions regarding 
management policies 23.9 
Meet with human resource 
personnel 
Union organizing 
None 
What if you joined NANE? 
Better off 
Worse off 
No difference  ***( - ) 
Unsure 
More likely to join if 
management neutral 52.1 * * (-I-) 
Reason coworkers don't join: 
Unfamiliar with NANE 
Antiunion 
NANE mistakes 12 .7**(- ; 
Fear of management 
retaliation 42.3 ***( + ; 
Positive view of management 
Considerations determining job satisfaction: 
Wages and benefits 16.9 
Job security 31.0 
Working conditions 40.8 * * ( + ) 
Unsure 11.3 
Note: Statistically significant differences from all 
99% confidence, ** 95% confidence, * 90% conn 
(—); significance levels are based on the Z statistic. 
with all others in the uncommitted i 
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TABLE 11.4. Attitudes Associated with Best Reasons for Not Joining Employee 
Organizations (in percent) 
Attitudes 
Likely to join NANE 
Better off with union 
Create Conflict 
at Work 
52.1 
50.7 
Work-related activities you would support: 
Petitions regarding 
management policies 
Meet with human resource 
personnel 
Union organizing 
None 
What if you joined NANE? 
Better off 
Worse off 
No difference 
Unsure 
More likely to join if 
management neutral 
Reason coworkers don't join: 
Unfamiliar with NANE 
Antiunion 
NANE mistakes 
Fear of management 
retaliation 
Positive view of management 
23.9 
46.5 
26.8 
22.5 
16.9 
25.4 
•42.3**»(-) 
15.5**( + ) 
52.1**( + ) 
16.9 
23.9 
12.7**(-) 
42.3***( + ) 
45.0 
Considerations determining job satisfaction: 
Wages and benefits 
Job security 
Working conditions 
Unsure 
16.9 
31.0 
40.8**( + ) 
11.3 
Hurt NCR 
27 .8***(- ) 
22 .2***(- ) 
22.2 
55.6 
13.9***(-) 
27.8 
5.6***(-) 
19.4 
66.7*( + ) 
8.3 
30.6 » ( - ) 
16.7 
38.9**( + ) 
25.0 
13.9***( + ) 
58.3**( + ) 
22.2 
27.8 
30.6 
19.4 
Loss of 
Individual 
Freedom 
36.0**(-) 
32.0***(-) 
20.0 
52.0 
30.0 
22.0 
12.0 
20.0 
66.0*( + ) 
2 .0***(- ; 
38.0 
24.0 
24.0 
16.0 
26.0 
34.0 
12.0 
40.0 
36.0 
. 12.0 
Total 
Uncommitted 
Middle 
49.4 
48.9 
23.9 
46.7 
28.3 
23.3 
17.2 
18.9 
55.0 
1 8.9 
42.8 
18.9 
24.4 
20.0 
29.4 
41.7 
16.7 
37.2 
30.6 
15.6 
Note: Statistically significant differences from all others in the uncommitted middle are denoted by * * * 
99% confidence, ** 95% confidence, * 90% confidence; the direction of difference is denoted by ( + ) or 
( - ); significance levels are based on the Z statistic. 
with all others in the uncommitted middle reveal some interesting patterns. 
For most questions, the answers of the conflict avoiders mirror those of 
others in the middle. Conflict avoiders are just as likely to join NANE (52.1 
percent), to believe they would be better off with a union (50.7 percent), 
and to have a positive view of management (45.0 percent). They also would 
support various workplace activities in the same proportion as others in the 
uncommitted middle. 
Given the overall similarity to the norm, the differences are all the more 
striking: 
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• The conflict avoiders are significantly less likely to believe that joining 
NANE would make no difference, significantly more likely to be un-
sure of the impact, and also more likely to believe that joining would 
cause problems (25.4 percent compared with 14.7 percent). 
• Given this cautiously pessimistic assessment, it is not surprising that the 
conflict avoiders would be affected significantly more by management 
neutrality than would others in the middle and would be more likely 
to join NANE under this scenario. 
• When asked why coworkers had not joined NANE, the conflict avoid-
ers were twice as likely as others in the uncommitted middle to select a 
response related to fear (42.3 percent compared with 21.2 percent). 
For each "type of organization preferred," the conflict avoiders were 
more likely to select a response related to fear than were the others 
preferring that type of organization. This is consistent with the idea 
that fear and conflict are entangled as influences on potential support 
for collective action. 
• Although job satisfaction for this subgroup (74.6 percent) is essentially 
the same as for others in the uncommitted middle (75.9 percent), the 
reasons cited are quite different. For both satisfied and dissatisfied 
conflict avoiders, the "main reason [they] feel that way" is significantly 
more likely to relate to noneconomic job conditions and less likely to 
relate to job security. 
The overall picture that emerges, then, is that those concerned about 
conflict are more pessimistic about the potential benefits of joining NANE, 
more likely to believe that coworkers do not join out of fear, and more 
concerned about working conditions/environment than their counterparts. 
Because they represent about 40 percent of the uncommitted middle, these 
concerns should be taken seriously. This important and large subgroup of 
cautious supporters of collective action would be particularly susceptible to 
management attempts to raise the specter of perpetual conflict during an 
organizing campaign. At NCR, winning majority status would be virtually 
impossible without appealing to most of those concerned about potential 
conflict. 
Table 11.4 also reports responses to a range of questions for those who 
believe that unionization would "hurt NCR" or would lead to "loss of 
individual freedom." Consistent with the types of organizations they prefer, 
respondents who answered that unionization would "hurt NCR" are decid-
edly antiunion. The "individual freedom" respondents are less so. Of partic-
ular interest, those who selected "loss of individual freedom" as the "best 
reason not to join any employee organization" nonetheless are as supportive 
of union organizing as others in the uncommitted middle and are less likely 
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to have a positive view of management. Perhaps the discontent of these 
workers could be tapped in an organizing campaign. 
Implications 
Union organizers have always contended with management-engendered 
fear. Inoculating workers during organizing by anticipating management's 
tactics has been standard practice for decades. Mainly the attention has 
been on fears of firing or management retaliation. This follows a framework 
established by the NLRB that focuses on illegal discriminatory actions 
against workers or threats concerning shutdown or conditions of employ-
ment. The NCR survey indicates that although fear is an important concern, 
the closely related issue of conflict may be even more essential in convincing 
some groups of workers to vote "no" in a representation election. 
If concern that unionization will result in conflict is as widespread in 
other workplaces as it is among NCR customer engineers, it may be appro-
priate to reevaluate and/or redesign the organizing tactics aimed at dissipat-
ing or circumventing appeals to fear. For example, warning workers about 
management's likely aggressive antiunion campaign may inoculate them 
against fear, but it may raise their concerns about conflict. Similarly, deploy-
ing a team of organizers to sign up workers before management can react 
may produce short-term gains, but does it also open the union to employer 
attempts to pin the blame for conflict on outside union agitators? If they 
are not carefully planned, even efforts to build worker solidarity through 
demonstrations and actions during the organizing campaign may backfire 
with the essential group of cautious but organizable workers. 
Traditionally, employers have raised the specter of conflict by focusing on 
the union's use of strikes and job actions. Under this scenario, the union 
response would include data on the relative infrequency of strikes and 
violence. But in this era of widespread uncertainty, disruption itself has 
become a tool for management. The NCR survey data indicate that workers 
in the uncommitted middle in organizing campaigns are more likely to be 
affected by the conflict generated during the campaign than they are to be 
intimidated by perceived management threats of retaliation. For these NCR 
technicians, disruption and increased tension at work were identified as 
by-products of any type of union presence. 
Obviously, management can create a sense of conflict simply by fighting 
the union, which it will do in virtually every private-sector organizing cam-
paign. It is almost as if the union is being pressured to assume responsibility 
for ensuring that worker organization will proceed without continual strug-
gle. Can management, just by being angry or unhappy with the organizing 
effort, convince employees that the conflict will only grow worse if they 
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support a union? Can union supporters in particular situations such as 
those at NCR convince their undecided coworkers that they can participate 
in the organizing effort without signing on to perpetual class warfare? Can 
unions help workers understand that organization offers them a powerful 
voice, and this is why management intentionally incites conflict as part of 
the effort to fight the union? 
Some lessons from industrial relations and case study research are rele-
vant here. White-collar workers generally and clerical workers specifically 
are less likely to vote for union representation if they associate unionization 
with strikes (Maranto and Fiorito 1987; Hurd and McElwain 1988). Cleri-
cals also are concerned that they may be ostracized by their coworkers and 
their supervisors if they support unionization. Because of this reticence, 
organizing tends to be a very slow process (Hurd 1990). Yet there have 
been notable successes-organizing clerical workers at private-sector univer-
sities and professional workers in health care. Furthermore, once they have 
made the decision to unionize, these workers have displayed incredible 
tenacity and have moved beyond their initial cautions to use strikes and 
other militant tactics when necessary. 
The key to overcoming reluctance among white-collar workers seems to 
be organizing around issues of voice using a grassroots approach with a 
large inside committee. White-collar workers often are confident that they 
can make a major contribution to their employer and are frustrated when 
management limits their role in decision making. Once these workers see 
unions as a vehicle to gain an effective voice, their enthusiasm grows. Both 
clerical and professional workers react against campaigns that fit the "third-
party" image and respond best to a democratic structure that allows them 
to take control of their own organization and use it to gain influence and 
respect and to enhance their professionalism (Hurd 1990). 
The CWA experience lends further credence to these observations. Recent 
organizing success among eighteen hundred telephone service representa-
tives in New England can largely be attributed to the voice provided by a 
local union led by customer service staff. Similarly, CWA Local 9119 has 
won two representation elections at the University of California for eight 
thousand technical and professional staff. There has been significant man-
agement opposition to the union, featuring "information" designed to in-
crease fear and engender the likelihood of perpetual conflict. But CWA local 
leadership rests primarily on elected officers with long-term careers at the 
university, and this committed leadership at each campus has made the 
difference. 
Organizing, then, needs to demonstrate the potential for the union to 
coexist as an equal with management not only in negotiations and grievance 
handling but also in solving a wide variety of workplace problems. To 
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demonstrate during the organizing campaign that the potential exists to 
bargain on a par with the employer, unions must respond to the conflict 
introduced by management without assuming responsibility for that con-
flict. Organizers need to be able to assist workers in developing an effective 
strategy of resisting management when it inevitably becomes necessary, 
without alienating conflict avoiders and others in the uncommitted middle. 
In a successful campaign, workers will realize that genuine voice requires 
independent organization and the ability to resist. Seemingly contradictory, 
voice and resistance both speak to the concerns not only of union supporters 
but also of the crucial uncommitted middle. It is this ability to resist that 
enables workers to have a powerful voice and to challenge management 
when necessary. Organizers need to be aware of the tension between voice 
and resistance and make clear that by participating effectively in collective 
bargaining, labor-management committees, and other forums the union can 
assure that perpetual conflict is not inevitable. 
In the CWA's experience, increasing worker ownership and leadership 
during the organizing campaign makes this dual-track unionism more credi-
ble. To win, the union must appeal to those in the uncommitted middle. 
They are more approachable if they can be convinced that the workers 
will own and control the future organization. And this ownership is more 
believable if the organizing committee has the deepest possible reach into 
the work group. Workers like the NCR customer engineers have tremen-
dous confidence in their ability to understand the technical details of their 
jobs. They have more faith in their coworkers than they could possibly have 
in organizers from outside the firm. 
The role of the union's organizers is to help build unity but not to lead 
the group. Based on the concerns expressed at NCR by the conflict avoiders, 
one key to success is for the organizer to convince activist committee mem-
bers to select tactics with careful attention to the potential effect on uncom-
mitted voters. In particular, when resistance is necessary, it is essential to 
plan carefully and to maximize the potential for victory. Although the sur-
vey does not speak directly to this question, we are convinced that technical 
workers like the NCR customer engineers are not afraid to fight; they just 
do not want to be involved in conflict if they are going to lose. 
The relevance of our findings to other settings can be assessed fully only 
by analyzing a wide variety of organizing cases. The NCR customer engi-
neers are, after all, highly skilled and middle income, and they have much 
to protect. Based on comparisons such as those summarized briefly above, 
we believe that their situation is representative of professional, technical, 
and other white-collar workers in the private sector. Similarities and differ-
ences in attitudes toward conflict among white-collar workers need to be 
explored, however, with careful attention to influences of gender, age, and 
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race. We are less confident that our conclusions on conflict apply to manu-
facturing, although we suspect that the proliferation of team-based produc-
tion systems also may make medium- to high-skilled blue-collar workers 
susceptible to employer efforts to portray unions as inevitably disruptive. 
The issue of conflict probably plays a role in most private-sector organizing 
campaigns, although in some settings (such as low-wage service work), 
conditions may be so bad that aversion to conflict dissolves. With a repre-
sentative committee that is sensitive to the doubts and fears of coworkers, 
the appropriate emphasis on resistance and voice can be determined. Our 
ultimate point is that although workers everywhere calculate the risk/re-
ward ratio in organizing, different circumstances lead to different solutions. 
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